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Russell recollects in his Autobiography and My Philosophical Development that his 
description theory gave the first clue to the solution to the set-theoretic and logical 
paradoxes that had been annoying him for years. This may sound strange, since the 
description theory is generally thought to have been established with a view to solving the 
problems about reference by denoting phrases, and to have nothing to do directly with the 
solution to these paradoxes. In fact, in “On denoting”, where he exposes the description 
theory, he doesn't mention them at all. It was his theory of types, advocated in 
“Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types”, that Russell solved the problems of 
paradoxes. Nevertheless, the description theory and the theory of types do have a close 
connection with each other. The aim of this article is to show what the connection is. 
The description theory and the theory of types can be viewed as related, through the 
same semantic principle, to the same atomistic ontology, which can be characterized as 
having as its terms only particular individuals and universal concepts. A remarkable feature 
of the theory of types is that it is a constructive grammar. It comprises, as its terms other 
than logical constants, only individual names and predicates applicable to them. Every 
other thing is constructed by degrees from them according to specific procedures. It should 
be noted that this theory admits neither denoting phrases nor names for sets to be 
grammatical. Russell intended it to provide a system which conforms to “the vicious circle 
principle”, but it also conforms to the resulting ontology from the description theory 
together with his persistent conviction in the principle of correspondence. 
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